EU Cohesion Policy after Brexit : the economic, social and institutional challenges by Bachtler, John & Begg, Iain
Bachtler, John and Begg, Iain (2017) EU Cohesion Policy after Brexit : 
the economic, social and institutional challenges. Journal of Social 
Policy, 46 (4). pp. 745-763. ISSN 0047-2794 , 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0047279417000514
This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/63754/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the Strathprints administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
The Strathprints institutional repository (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) is a digital archive of University of Strathclyde research 
outputs. It has been developed to disseminate open access research outputs, expose data about those outputs, and enable the 
management and persistent access to Strathclyde's intellectual output.
1 | P a g e  
 
Cohesion policy after Brexit: the economic, social and institutional challenges 
 
Abstract: 
Since 1988, when the current EU Cohesion Policy was introduced, it has played an influential role in 
setting priorities for policies aimed at dealing with the effects of European economic integration on 
regional and social disparities. Although, latterly, the amount of money spent in the UK through the 
European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) has declined, EU programmes have had a 
disproportionate effect on the design and implementation of UK policies shaping regional and local 
economic and social development. This paper starts by recalling how EU Cohesion Policy has 
functioned in the UK, then considers how Brexit may affect regional and social development and the 
need for a corresponding policy response, focusing on the sorts of policies currently supported by 
the ERDF and the ESF. The paper shows that filling the policy vacuum will be far from 
straightforward because complementary national policies and institutional frameworks have lacked 
consistency or coherence. It concludes by examining the wider policy issues arising from rethinking 
domestic policy outside the ESIF framework. The sub-national level, in particular, will need a fresh 
approach following Brexit.  
Introduction 
Leaving the European Union (EU) will involve the most extensive upheaval for decades in British 
economic and social policy. Whether the outcome is liberating or damaging depends at least partly 
on the societal and territorial distribution of costs and benefits and on the design and 
implementation of any alternative policy framework. There will be winners and losers, but who will 
fall into the two groups depends on policy choices. 
ZŽŽƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ^ŽĐŝĂůDŽĚĞů ? ?ƚŚĞhĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨĐ ŚĞƐŝŽŶĐŽŵďŝŶĞƐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
development and social justice, delivered through programmes tailored to the specific development 
needs and challenges of different areas. Since the late 1980s, Cohesion Policy has been a principal 
means of countering economic, social and territorial disparities across the EU. Although now 
concentrated on the poorer countries and regions of central, eastern and southern Europe, EU policy 
has been influential in shaping the approach taken in the UK to economic and social policy 
interventions. It has affected governance by providing stability through multi-annual programmes, 
promoted a strategic and integrated approach to development through a partnership approach 
bringing together central and subnational levels of government and representatives of civil society.  
/ŶƚŚĞh<ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ2014 review of EU competences, the report on social policies (HMG 2014a) 
emphasised the connections between the single market and the limited array of policies in which 
there is EU-level intervention. However, the review drew ĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞh ?ƐĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŝŶ
successive reforms towards more explicit social aims, all of which were endorsed by the UK. 
Specifically, Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union, in setting out the fundamental aims of the 
hŶŝŽŶ ?ƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐ ? ?ĐŽŵďĂƚŝŶŐ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůĞǆ ůƵƐŝŽŶĂŶĚĚŝƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚŝŵƉƌŽǀŝŶŐ
 ‘ůŝǀŝŶŐĂŶĚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?dŚĞƐĂŵĞAƌƚŝĐůĞƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽƚŚĞƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ?ƐŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚ
territŽƌŝĂůĐŽŚĞƐŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƐŽůŝĚĂƌŝƚǇĂŵŽŶŐhĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? ?ƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐĂũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞuropean 
Social Fund (ESF).  
In short, the UK has acquired a broad social legacy from its EU membership. This legacy arguably 
accords with UK political preferences for a social model shared with much with the rest of the EU. As 
such, it belies the threats to introduce a radically different socio-economic model (for which the UK 
Government evidently has no obvious mandate) if Brexit negotiations go badly. 
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Under EU Cohesion Policy, the UK has an allocation of over £10 billion for the 2014-20 period, 
implemented through six European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) programmes and six ESF 
programmes, managed separately in England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales and Gibraltar. Their 
ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐĂƌĞŐŽǀĞƌŶĞĚďǇĂ ‘WĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ? negotiated between the UK Government and 
the European Commission, and their management is subject to a complex EU regulatory framework 
that prescribes almost every aspect of the administration of the Funds. These programmes co-
finance UK policies for innovation, SME competitiveness, low carbon, broadband, urban 
development, social inclusion, skills and employment (HMG 2014b). Many local authorities, 
development/enterprise bodies, and the voluntary sector rely on EU funding for investment projects 
and services (Miller 2016). 
A central question for the UK Government and the Devolved Administrations (DAs) is whether the 
conjunction of an integrated, place-based policy approach and the specific social targets of ESF 
funding should continue after Brexit. The UK competence review on Cohesion Policy cites (HMG 
2014c, paragraph 3.69) the Welsh Government view that certain socially-orientated EU initiatives 
 “were ill-conceived as EU interventions and better suited to regional development, control and 
deployment ?. However, UK domestic  regional and local development interventions have focused 
mainly on economic objectives  W productivity, innovation and entrepreneurship. Only in Scotland is 
social inclusion recognised explicitly as a driver of improved economic performance and integrated 
within development strategies (SG 2016).  
These are important issues for post-Brexit policy, given the perceived importance of inequality in  W 
at least partly  W explaining the voting patterns of Leave and Remain.  It has been argued that parts of 
the country with lower levels of wages, skills, employment opportunities and wealth were more 
likely to vote to leave the EU (Bell and Machin 2016, Darvas 2016, Clarke et al. 2017), but also 
related to perceptions and experiences of the economic opportunity or threats of EU membership 
(Dorling et al 2016).  This has been recognised politically in post-referendum debates and in the 
ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŽƐĞ ‘ũƵƐƚĂďŽƵƚŵĂŶĂŐŝŶŐ (JAMs) ?ĂƐƚŚe segment of society requiring increased 
attention from social policy ?KŶĞŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽĐůĂŝŵĞĚŐŽĂůƐŽĨƚŚĞh<WƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌdŚĞƌĞƐĂDĂǇŝƐ “Ă
ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇƚŚĂƚǁŽƌŬƐĨŽƌĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞ ? ? [and ? ? ? the need to rebalance the economy across sectors and 
areas in order to ƐƉƌĞĂĚǁĞĂůƚŚĂŶĚƉƌŽƐƉĞƌŝƚǇĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ? (CCHQ 2016). 
Reverting to full national control of regional development policies will entail choices about much 
more than future funding models (Bachtler and Begg 2016). Administratively, the procedures for 
managing Structural Funds have become ingrained in the domestic policy thinking and practice of 
the UK Government and the DAs (Gore 2008, Bachtler et al. 2016). UK regional and local 
development has also been influenced by wider EU policy frameworks, often applied through the 
ESIF, notably the Europe 2020 strategy, successive social inclusion initiatives, EU competition policy 
(State aid controls) and EU environmental policy (Natura 2000). Freed from EU regulatory 
obligations, and with the scope to reallocate EU budgetary contributions for domestic purposes, the 
UK Government, DAs and other stakeholders will also have to rethink post-Brexit objectives and how 
they dovetail with social policy priorities, the new UK industrial strategy, and the instruments and 
governance of economic and social development. Using regional policies to address both economic 
and social cohesion goals is not a given, and it is unclear whether and how the UK government 
authorities at different levels will continue to apply an integrated and place-based policy approach. 
This paper examines the validity of retaining the EU model of regional economic and social 
development following Brexit. It begins with the conceptual underpinnings, then reviews the policy 
objectives, resources and effectiveness of interventions funded under the ERDF and ESF. It concludes 
by discussing the policy options for the retention, replacement or termination of the ESIF in the UK. 
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Economic and social cohesion: EU rationales for policy intervention 
Cohesion Policy in the EU has been shaped by various conceptual models and by the experience of 
policy development over decades, especially since the late 1980s when major reforms were enacted. 
In considering what happens next, it is worth recalling how the policy has developed before 
assessing its relevance to a post-Brexit UK. Relevant insights can be gained from place-based 
regional policy (Barca 2009), fiscal federalism, innovation-based growth and, latterly, the social 
investment paradigm (Hemerijck 2017). 
The case for a spatial approach is that territorial inequality matters,  government has a responsibility 
to intervene, and intervention can be effective (Bachtler 2001), both economically and socially.  
These assumptions have guided EU policies since the 1950s, though with significant differences over 
time and space. Until the 1980s, regional policies were mainly redistributive, focusing on 
ĐŽŵƉĞŶƐĂƚŝŶŐ ‘ƉƌŽďůĞŵƌĞŐŝŽŶƐ ?ǁŝƚŚstructural or geographical disadvantages through business aid 
or infrastructure investment to promote employment creation.  
They also encompassed overtly social objectives, such as dealing with the consequences of high 
unemployment.  For the past three decades, EU policy has had a more allocative role, supporting 
more efficient use of endogenous resources in all regions, in particular through support for new firm 
formation, SME development and innovation.  However, social policy aims continue to be important, 
evident in the emphasis given to countering social exclusion and boosting the employment rate of 
vulnerable groups. 
In the UK, the objective of regional policy has been primarily regional and local economic 
development aimed at improving national economic efficiency. Insofar as it had (has) a social 
dimension, this was concerned with alleviating the negative consequences of structural change, 
notably unemployment. This UK approach contrasts with the underlying philosophy of regional 
policies in many Continental European countries, where the objective of economic efficiency is 
accompanied by a commitment to social equity (Bachtler et al. 2010, Davies et al. 2015, 2016). In 
Germany, the Basic Law includes a constitutional goal of equivalent living conditions (gleichwertige 
Lebensverhältnisse) (Bundestag 2010).  French regional policy is also underpinned by a constitutional 
obligation for government to promote equality between territorial authorities, combining regional 
economic competitiveness and territorial and social cohesion (MEF 2015). There is a similar 
provision in the Italian constitution, and policy actions in a range of other countries  W Finland, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland  W are grounded in policy objectives for 
 ‘ďĂůĂŶĐĞĚĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƐŽůŝĚĂƌŝƚǇ ? ? 
These European traditions are also reflected in the objectives of EU Cohesion Policy, stated in 
Articles 174 to 178 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. dŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ ‘ŽďƐƚĂĐůĞƐ ?ƚŽ
European integration, the European Community made provisions from the start for the ESF (created 
in 1957), complemented by the establishment of the ERDF in 1975, following the accession of the 
UK. These funds were brought together with the then European Agricultural Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund (EAGGF, Guidance Section) ĂƐ ‘^ƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂů&ƵŶĚƐ ?ĨƌŽŵ ? ? ? ?ŽŶǁĂƌĚƐ 
(complemented from 1994 by the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance, FIFG) and allocated 
an increasing share of spending, now accounting for about one third of the EU budget. 
This policy framework for meeting the EU objectives of economic, social and territorial cohesion has 
continued to the present day. There is, though, an ongoing academic and policy debate on the 
relative merits of a placed-based approach to economic and social development compared to so-
ĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ƉĞŽƉůĞ-based development ? (Barca 2009, Bachtler et al. 2010, Seravalli 2015).  On the basis of 
theoretical work relating to the spatial agglomeration of economic activity (Krugman 2010, Venables 
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2010), the World Bank and others have questioned the efficacy of regional policies, advocating 
ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚ ‘ƐƉĂƚŝĂůůǇ-ďůŝŶĚ ?ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ?Ğ ?Ő ?ĐŽŵŵŽŶƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐŽĨƉƵďůŝĐƐĞƌǀŝĐ ƐƐƵĐŚĂƐĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ
health, flexible labour markets) to facilitate migration and concentration (Brakmann et al. 2005).  
In a European context, however, it has been questioned whether migration and development will 
reduce disparities, apart from the social and environmental implications of economic development 
(Rigg et al. 2009, Scott 2009, Garretsen and Martin 2010, Hart 2010). Institutional theories have 
emphasised ƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨ ‘ƉůĂĐĞ ?ŝŶĞǆƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐŐƌŽǁƚŚĂŶĚƚŚĞƐƉĂƚŝĂůůǇ-contingent economic 
and institutional factors underlying uneven socio-economic development (Williamson 2009, Farole 
et al. 2009, OECD 2009, Rodriguez Pose 2010). This line of thinking was applied to the rationale for 
EU Cohesion Policy in the influential Barca Report which argued that the place-specificity of natural 
and institutional resources requires both economic and social policy interventions to be tailored to 
places  W rather than being aspatial or targeted at sectors (Barca 2009). Crucial to this approach are 
governance structures that can ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĂŶ ‘ŽƉƚŝŵĂůŵŝǆ ?ŽĨŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ?ŝŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ?
social inclusion, human capital, innovation, R&D etc) as part of integrated development strategies 
involving vertical coordination (between levels of government) and horizontal cooperation between 
relevant economic and social actors at each level.  
These conceptual debates are reflected in the tension in EU policymaking between an increasingly 
strong emphasis on policy objectives and institutional reforms to promote economic growth, 
employment and social inclusion, and a territorial approach for responding to the development and 
needs and challenges of regions, cities and localities. In the social policy field, in particular, there are 
periodic questions as to whether EU employment and social policy objectives are better achieved 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ‘ŚŽƌŝǌŽŶƚĂů ?Žƌ ‘place-based ? policies (Begg 2010, Bachtler et al 2016) 
 
EU Structural Funds in the UK 
The UK has been a major beneficiary of the Structural Funds since its accession to the (then) 
European Community (see Figure 1). Over the period from 1975 to 2020, the UK has been allocated 
some £66 billion; with public and private sector co-financing of programmes, the funding for EU-
supported regional economic and social development exceeds £100 billion. Especially in the 1970s 
and 1980s, the UK was one of the biggest recipients of EU funding given the scale of its industrial 
problems and associated unemployment. Until 1988, the UK received 20-25% of the ERDF budget 
mainly for infrastructure projects in industrial regions and some rural areas, and up to a third of the 
ESF budget for employment and training programmes, in particular to help manage sectoral 
restructuring.  
Throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s, the UK remained a substantial beneficiary from both 
funds, but since the 2004 enlargement of the EU, the amount received has progressively shrunk. 
From 2007 onwards, Structural Funds became available to all regions in the UK, though with a 
continued focus on the lagging (now termed  ‘Less-Developed ?) areas accorded higher levels of 
funding.  
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Figure 1: UK share of EC/EU Cohesion policy appropriations, 1975-2020  
 
Note: ERDF and ESF up to 1988, thereafter for all Structural Funds 1999-2020. 
Source: ERDF and ESF annual reports, Bachtler et al (2006, 2013), Mendez et al (2013). 
 
The current allocation of Structural Funds to the UK for the 2014-20 period is £10.3 billion, of which 
c.£4.3 billion is for social policy. The highest per capita aid levels are in Wales (c. £690 per head), 
Northern Ireland (c.£300), North East England, and South West England (both c.£250). EU funding is 
particularly important in two  ‘ůĞƐƐ-ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ ?regions -  West Wales & The Valleys and Cornwall & 
Isles of Scilly - which have the most generous programmes in terms of aid and flexible conditions on 
investment. Other important recipients are North West England, the West Midlands and Scotland 
(see Figure 2). 
The domestic significance of Cohesion Policy 
The level of EU funding of ESIF in the UK equates to only 0.1% of UK GDP and could be regarded as 
inconsequential, yet has important achievements and genuine additionality. Projects and localities 
that have come to rely on the funding would feel its loss. This disjunction between the relatively 
modest aggregate scale of support from the policy and its ability to make a difference at project 
level bears on the politics of change. At local level or for those involved in supporting disadvantaged 
ƐŽĐŝĂůŐƌŽƵƉƐ ?ƚŚĞŵĞƌĞĨĂĐƚŽĨĂƉƵďůŝĐƉŽůŝĐǇĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚŵĂƚƚĞƌƐ ?WƌĞǀŝŽƵƐƐƚƵĚŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĂĚĚĞĚ
ǀĂůƵĞ ?ŽĨŽŚĞƐŝŽŶWolicy have consistently argued that economic development spending by national 
and local government would be lower in the absence of the requirement to co-finance ESIF. Given 
the absence of alternatives for many of the objectives supported by the ESF, it is likely to be an even 
greater factor in social policy. 
At EU level, the performance of the funds has been contested, not least because of divergent results 
from evaluations of the impact and efficiency of the Structural Funds (Boldrin and Canova 2001, 
Ederveen 2003, Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi 2004, Polverari and Bachtler 2014). The main 
methodological approaches employed  W modelling, econometric research, micro-economic studies 
and case study research  W all face challenges of accurate and timely data and the intractability of 
constructing a convincing counterfactual. Some of the more influential findings cast doubt on 
whether there any benefits, prompting questions about whether post-Brexit policy should retain, 
ĂĚĂƉƚŽƌƌĞũĞĐƚƚŚĞh ?ƐĨĂǀŽƵƌĞĚĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐ ?
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Nevertheless, verdicts on EU Cohesion Policy have become more positive in recent years, although 
the extent of variation in results remains striking. dŚĞŵŽƐƚƌĞĐĞŶƚĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞZ& ?Ɛ
contribution in the UK concluded that, over the 2007-13 period, EU-funded interventions led directly 
to the creation of over 152 000 jobs, over 29,000 of them in SMEs and c.3,800 in research. Additional 
investment supported through EU funding was estimated to have increased GDP in the UK in 2015 
by 0.1% beyond its level in the absence of the policy (after allowing for the UK ?Ɛ contributions the 
financing of Cohesion policy) and projected GDP to be 0.2% higher by 2023 (Applica et al 2016).  
Evaluations of ESF also contain some evidence of impact. Larger numbers of people in the UK 
participated in EU-funded employment and training schemes (7 million participants in the Action to 
Employment programme) than would otherwise have been possible (Metis et al 2016), and there are 
positive results for employability in both England (Ainsworth and Marlow 2011, Kearney and Lloyd 
2016) and Scotland (Hall Aitken 2012). ESF also appears to have contributed to a reduction in 
regional differences in employment rates and skill levels, albeit to a variable degree across the 
country (Ainsworth et al. 2011).  
 
Figure 2: Allocations of Structural Funds within the UK, 2014-20  
 
The social dimension of EU policy in the UK 
As in other Member, States UK government authorities had the option to choose from a range of 
priorities in focusing its use of the ESF funding for social objectives in the 2014-20 period, opting for 
three: inclusive labour markets (combining employment and inclusion objectives); skill for growth; 
and technical assistance. For England, the DWP chose to target the policy at groups facing 
disadvantage in the labour market, such as lone parents, women returners to the labour market, 
women from certain ethnic minorities characterised by very low employment rates ?ĂŶĚ ‘EdƐ ?. 
Programmes cover all areas of England, recognising that target groups are found in prosperous as 
well as poorer regions. A stated objective is to use ESF to assist those most disadvantaged on the 
grounds that they find it hardest to obtain jobs, with the implication that complementary domestic 
policies do not do enough in this regard. Once ESF programmes end, the question will be whether 
and how to address this social need in domestic policy.  
Much the same approach is evident in how youth policy is supported by the ESF, with support 
focused on the most disadvantaged and least connected to the labour market  W  NEETs and youths 
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emerging from the care system are mentioned. In relation to poverty, the Department of Work & 
Pensions (DWP) (2015: 17) again assigns ESF funding to specific segments of its strategies on social 
ũƵƐƚŝĐĞĂŶĚĐŽŵďĂƚƚŝŶŐƉŽǀĞƌƚǇ ?ǁŝƚŚĂŶĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐ ‘ŽŶƉĞŽƉůĞǁŝƚŚŵƵůƚŝƉůĞĂŶĚĐŽŵƉůĞǆďĂƌƌŝĞƌƐĂŶĚ
ŵĂƌŐŝŶĂůŝƐĞĚŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ? ?ǆĂŵƉůĞƐŝŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚŽƐĞǁŝƚŚĚƌƵŐĂŶĚĂůĐŽŚŽůĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐǇĂŶĚŽĨĨĞŶĚĞƌƐ ?
as well as those subject to barriers to connection with the labour market, such as lack of transport. 
In relation to skills, the DWP approach is to use ESF mainly to redress shortcomings in basic skills, but 
also to boost higher skills where there are gaps in national provision. 
In Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and Gibraltar, investments also target the unemployed 
(especially young people), women, those on low incomes, single-parent households and deprived 
communities. Support, too, is being provided for educational attainment and vocational training, 
including apprentice schemes in Northern Ireland, Gibraltar and parts of Scotland ? ‘ƐƚĂŐĞĚƉŝƉĞůŝŶĞ ?
system is being used in Scotland to tailor support around individual jobseekers, in contrast to using a 
generic approach; projects promote labour market mobility and improve equal access to 
employment and training for jobseekers, and in particular those needing most help.  
These interventions involve large number of people being supported under the different priorities 
(see Table 1). 
Table 1: Selected indicators for ESF Operational Programmes in the UK, 2014-20 
OP Priorities Quantified outcome targets 
England Inclusive labour market  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐĂƐƐŝƐƚĞĚŝŶƚŽǁŽƌŬ ? 
78,000 young people assisted into work, education 
and ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ ? 
 Skills for growth 140,000 participants with improved basic skills. 
300,000+ participants gaining qualifications at level 2 
ŽƌĂďŽǀĞ ? 
N.Ireland Enhancing job opportunities 40,000 people supported 
 Youth employment 25,000 participants not in employment, education or 
training 
Scotland Social exclusion and poverty 27,000 people assisted. 
 Education and training 37,000 people gaining new qualifications. 
 Youth Employment Initiative 6500 young people in south-west Scotland supported. 
Wales Tacking poverty 48,700 economically inactive (aged 25 and over) 
people assisted, not in education or training, who 
have complex barriers to employment. 
14,600 long-term unemployed (aged 25 and over) 
assisted, who have complex barriers to employment. 
 Skills for growth 40,900 employed assisted, including self-employed 
participants with no formal education. 
70,000 employed assisted, including self-employed 
participants with qualifications up to and including a 
lower secondary education. 
 Youth employment and attainment 63,800 participants not in employment, education or 
training 
Source: ESF Operational Programme documents. European Commission ESF website. 
 
At UK level, the Government has been at pains to distinguish ESF support from existing national 
ƐĐŚĞŵĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚƵƐƚŽĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƚŚĞ ‘ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ?ŽĨƚŚĞĨƵŶĚŝŶŐ ?/ƚĨŽůůŽǁƐƚŚĂƚǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂůŽĨ
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the UK from the ESF entails continuing EU-funded schemes with additional domestic resources, 
replacing them with national initiatives or accepting a down-grading of the priority given to social 
groups currently supported by ESF, predominantly the most disadvantaged. Given the overall 
pressure on social policy budgets, specifically (including the establishment of a welfare spending 
ceiling as part of the Charter For Budget Responsibility (HMT 2017)), and public finances generally, 
government will therefore be obliged to decide if it should maintain the  distinctive support for the 
most disadvantaged. An ŽƉĞŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚŝƐǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞƉƌŽŵŝƐĞĚ ‘'ƌĞĂƚZĞƉĞĂůŝůů ? ?Ă
misnomer, to the extent that it will convert EU law into national law, rather than discard it) will 
include the ERDF, ESF and other regulations associated with Cohesion Policy. 
What might Brexit change? 
There are many, often mutually exclusive, scenarios for the long-term effects of leaving the EU. 
However, there is no ready-ŵĂĚĞ ‘ƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨƌĞǆŝƚ ?ŽŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŽďĂƐĞĂŶĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨŝƚƐůŝŬĞůǇ
effects on cohesion within the UK or the prospective evolution of the approach to social policy. 
Leaving the EU cannot simply be conceptualised as the mirror-image of the theories of integration 
deployed to analyse joining an entity such as the EU. Although the UK economy, in the year after the 
referendum, proved to be resilient, Brexit proper is still to come. At the macroeconomic level, most 
studies suggest longer-term growth will be slower than if the country remained in the EU, with the 
outcome depending on a complex interplay between the future trade and investment regimes, 
together with the scope for adopting a different regulatory mix (Begg and Mushövel 2016).  
As with any disruptive economic event or process, Brexit will have uneven distributive effects, again 
depending on the detail of the future relationship between the UK and the EU27. A wide range of 
determinants will be influential, including future patterns of migration, dependency on EU migrants 
to fill jobs, the effects of switches in demand from imports to domestic suppliers, any loss of export 
markets and changes in the incentives facing different classes of investors (Baldwin, 2016). Some 
systematic sectoral effects can also be anticipated, such as adverse effects on farming or financial 
services from, respectively, losing EU subsidies or market access, or beneficial effects on fisheries if 
EU competitors are deterred. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been an important source of investment and jobs in some 
regional economies. Prior to the EU referendum, it was estimated that FDI could fall by 22% over the 
next decade (Dhingra et al. 2016). Outside the South-East, it is Scotland, North West England, West 
Midlands, Wales and Northern Ireland which have gained most FDI over the past decade and are, 
therefore, most vulnerable to a slowdown in foreign investment. Rural counties such as North 
Yorkshire and Dorset, and more urban ones, like West Yorkshire and Lancashire, are more integrated 
with the EU (Springford et al. 2016). These are regions with a greater dependence on manufacturing, 
agriculture, mining and extraction, and utilities sectors, which are more skewed towards EU markets, 
and more vulnerable to disruption of trade if the UK is no longer part of the single market, as the UK 
Government seems to favour. 
The two-year process of negotiations following the triggering of Article 50 is expected to be 
intensive, with no guarantee that a satisfactory outcome will be achieved by the spring of 2019. 
There will also be a need to negotiate new economic relationships with the rest of the EU, but also 
with other countries. Even in the most favourable scenarios, reaching such deals is likely to be a 
lengthy process. From a social policy perspective there are the ramifications of uncertainty about the 
outcome, potentially disrupting plans for policy development, the emergence of both predictable 
and unforeseen difficulties as the contours of new settlements become clearer, and the risk of 
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financial and executive resources becoming over-stretched, complicating the implementation of 
policy responses.  
 
Future commitments to cohesion-related policy goals 
Brexit outcomes will also depend on policy responses, the priority given to social and territorial 
inequalities and the institutional capacity at national and sub-national levels to specific regional and 
local challenges. In this respect, the UK track record is not promising.  Policies on territorial 
development have been subject to sudden change, with the creation or termination of policies, 
instruments and governance arrangements, yet limited time for preparation or scrutiny, 
undermining their potential effectiveness and efficiency (NAO 2013, Martin et al 2015, Bachtler 
2017).   
Although the impact of Brexit on UK public finances was a prominent theme of the referendum 
campaign, it focused mainly on the direct savings from ending UK contributions to the EU budget, 
ŶĞŐůĞĐƚŝŶŐƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĨĨĞĐƚƐǁŚŝĐŚƐƵƌĨĂĐĞĚƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ ?ŶŽƚůĞĂƐƚƚŚĞůŝŬĞůǇ ‘ĚŝǀŽƌĐĞďŝůů ? ?  
In relation to Cohesion Policy, there are two important budgetary issues. The first is whether funding 
for the social policies and for regional economic development currently channelled through the EU is 
continued, recognising that any direct saving from ending payments into the EU budget is likely to be 
over-shadowed by the induced effect of GDP changes on the public finances. The Treasury is known 
to be taking a zero-based budgeting approach to decisions on replacement funding, and much will 
depend on the case made by recipients for transitional or permanent support to allow the 
continuation of EU-funded programmes and projects  W a lobbying process that has already started 
(e.g. GCC 2016, WG 2017, ICA 2017).  
The second question is whether the domestic co-funding (from public and private sector sources) 
will continue to be available, particularly for the many small-scale social projects that would not be 
viable without it The multiannual financial planning required for ESIF effectively ring-fenced a certain 
level of funding in the budgets of government departments at different levels and other 
organisations in order to absorb money from ESIF. With public expenditure currently under great 
pressure, especially at local government level, there must be doubts, not least when there is already 
a crisis in the funding of social care. Some budgetary prioritisation is already underway in the 
transition strategies of managing authorities responsible for Structural Funds programmes to focus 
on projects with the greatest potential legacy (Woolford 2016, Bachtler 2017). Economic and social 
projects reliant on EU funding are having to reconsider  investment plans and service provision, as 
well as looking for alternative funding sources (Macpherson 2016, Zolle 2016).   
With up to 1,000 projects expected to be funded through Structural Funds by the time of UK 
withdrawal, there are major risks which will vary across policy domains and sectors. At the start of 
the 2014-20 period, the UK Government and DAs forecast supporting over 206,000 firms and 
creating almost 81,000 jobs. Over two million people were expected to be assisted under one of the 
ESF-funded interventions for skills development, social inclusion, employability and youth training 
and employment. Previous research has shown the risks to economic development from a steep 
reduction or termination of EU funding (Di Cataldo 2016). An immediate concern is to avoid a 
sudden and damaging disruption of regional and local development strategies, as well as the many 
social projects dependent on EU funding. 
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Beyond Brexit: rethinking UK policies 
Beyond the issues of funding and the management of the transition process, there could be an 
opportunity for the UK, and its constituent jurisdictions, to devise new policy models better tailored 
to the socio-economic challenges of today. This prompts the question of what the optimal rationale, 
framework and mechanisms would be for fostering economic development in a post-Brexit UK. In 
this regard, the increasing separation highlighted by McCann (2016) between a dynamic, outward-
looking and globally-orientated London (and hinterland) economy and the rest of the country is 
salient, as is the extent of social divisions. Manifestly unanswered and, at this stage unanswerable, 
are questions about how different parts of the UK will be economically affected by Brexit and, as a 
result, what sort of response will be required. 
The challenges for UK policymakers are whether and how to develop a new approach to spatial 
imbalances and the distinctive ESF social objectives in a new political context and without the 
guaranteed funding, but also obligations, of EU Cohesion policy. The industrial strategy launched by 
/^ŝŵƉůŝĞƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐŽƵƚůŝŶĞĚŝŶƚŚĞh< ‘ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ
ƉůĂŶ ? ?,Dd ? ? ? ? ? ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇƚŚĞĨŽĐƵƐŽŶŝŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ.  However, it does seem to 
signal a phase of more active intervention and ĂŶĞǁĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨƉůĂĐĞ ? ?ůĂƌŬ
2016, Jones 2016, DBEIS 2017).  Similar thinking about renewed territorial responses to inequality 
and social inclusion is evident among the DAs. In Scotland, the government is prioritising action to 
address regional economic inequalities, and development strategies in Wales and Northern Ireland 
both recognise the need for greater sub-regional balance.  
There are several fundamental issues areas for policy debate about the successor policies to ESIF. 
x Policy rationale. UK domestic policy for territorial development has historically not had the 
same interconnection between economic and social cohesion that has characterised the EU 
Structural Funds. The motivation for UK regional policy has been largely economic efficiency, in 
terms of promoting growth and competitiveness or reducing unemployment. By contrast with other 
European countries, a commitment to social justice is missing. 
x Policy funding for post-ESIF territorial development. There is clearly no guarantee that the UK 
Government will decide to provide funding to replace EU-funded policies, notwithstanding pressure 
from existing recipients.  Given that the UK is undergoing its own process of change in institutional 
structures  W notably the new fiscal settlement for Scotland and the push towards English devolution 
 W attention will need to be paid to the relevant inter-governmental mechanisms and forms of multi-
level governance. For the DAs, there are important decisions how about any successor funding is 
managed within the UK system, for example whether funding is allocated as part of the Barnett 
formula or through other objective criteria (Bell 2017). 
 
x Policy and institutional frameworks. The UK has been inconsistent in its commitment to 
regional policy, with fluctuating political interest and resources, and intervention at different spatial 
scales. Moreover, the weight accorded to social objectives has been erratic. The current subnational 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚůĂŶĚƐĐĂƉĞŝŶŶŐůĂŶĚ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŝƐĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞĚďǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƚǇƉĞƐŽĨ ‘ĚĞĂů ?
between city authorities and local enterprise bodies, and loose regional frameworks (Northern 
Powerhouse, Midlands Engine) guiding discretionary spending decisions.  A pressing issue is to 
create a stable long-term institutional framework for subnational economic and social development 
that transcends electoral cycles. Brexit might well offer opportunities for a new UK-wide socio-
economic development approach, or at least mechanisms for cooperation, comparable to those in 
11 | P a g e  
 
countries with federal or devolved systems of governance such as Austria, Germany, Spain and 
Switzerland.  
x Policy focus. The Europe 2020 strategy narrative that underpins EU policy today may not 
survive Brexit. However, the key EU themes of social inclusion, innovation, entrepreneurship, low 
carbon and employment  W on which most Cohesion Policy funding is spent - would probably also 
feature strongly in any UK domestic policy.   
x Policy rules. Current policy has strings attached that could be loosened in a post-Brexit 
context. For example, investment in infrastructure has been restricted by EU rules (outside of the 
less-developed regions). Many of the administratively complicated EU rules on financial 
management, control and audit could also be simplified and brought into line with national practice. 
x Policy instruments. It must be doubtful whether a post-Brexit UK policy would see the re-
creation of multi-ĂŶŶƵĂůƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƐĂƐŝŶƚŽĚĂǇ ?ƐŽŚĞƐŝŽŶWolicy, and there is risk of reverting to 
an ad hoc, politics-driven approach to creating short-term instruments and funds of the types 
characteristic of recent UK domestic social and territorial development interventions. EU-funded 
financial instruments (loans, guarantees, equity) might well be retained; these have become a more 
significant component of public investment, favoured by the Treasury compared to grants because 
they are more conducive to deficit reduction, and involve the private sector more directly, but they 
are often trickier for sub-national governments to manage.  
x International cooperation. With an EU allocation of £820 million, the UK participates in 14 
cross-border, transnational and interregional programmes, mainly with neighbouring countries. This 
may be one area of EU policy that continues, with the UK participating as a so-ĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ƚŚŝƌĚĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?
and funding its involvement wholly through domestic resources. These programmes have a major 
political value for some DAs, notably cross-border cooperation in the case of Northern Ireland, and 
^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ƐƚƌĂŶƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞEŽƌĚŝĐĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?^ŽĂƌĞƐ ? ? ? ?, de Mars 2016). This 
may also be relevant for south-east England, depending on future border control arrangements with 
France and the prospect of resulting social tensions. More broadly, participation would enable the 
UK to demonstrate its continued commitment to European cooperation outside the EU. 
Conclusions 
One of the striking features of the 2016 UK referendum on the EU was the strong spatial dimension 
to the pattern of voting. While not as simple as a division between prosperous and less prosperous 
ůŽĐĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ?ŽƌďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ŚĂǀĞƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŚĂǀĞ-ŶŽƚƐ ?ĂŵŽŶŐǀŽƚĞƌƐ (Clarke et al. 2017), these divisions 
testify to a kingdom much less united than its name suggests. An obvious implication is that Brexit 
will be socially divisive and that, in the aftermath of Brexit, a sustained policy effort will be needed 
to overcome these divisions.  
Although subject to considerable uncertainty, it is probable that Brexit will reduce UK growth and 
jobs over the medium-term. The impact on unemployment or on the job opportunities for the 
indigenous population or established foreign-born residents depends on how labour supply  W 
particularly of EU nationals  W reacts. If Brexit deters mobile EU nationals,  the UK labour market 
could move to a new equilibrium of fewer workers and fewer jobs, but with no change in 
unemployment. A consequence could be to aggravate recruitment difficulties in a variety of services, 
especially those in sectors such as care, which are poorly paid. 
Lower growth would also affect the public finances. Whether or not this would be offset by the 
reduction in UK contributions to the EU budget depends on the extent of any GDP change, although 
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the likelihood in the short-term is that the public finances will be £12 billion per annum worse off1, 
exceeding the potential gain from no longer paying into the EU budget. Moreover, because of the 
ůŝŬĞůǇ ‘ĚŝǀŽƌĐĞ ?ďŝůů ?ƚŚĞƌĞǁŝůůƉƌŽďĂďůǇďĞĂůŝŶŐĞƌŝŶŐĐŽƐƚĨŽƌ4-5 years beyond conclusion of exit 
negotiations, even if the UK decides not to participate in any EU spending programmes, such as for 
research. 
At UK level, the amount of funding allocated by Cohesion Policy programmes is not that great, but 
for local authorities and other organisations in some parts of the UK, it is an important source of 
revenue. Without it, some economic development or social projects will not go ahead at the same 
scale, over the current timescale, or even at all. A contentious policy question is whether any of 
these budgets survive Brexit, even with the most favourable outcome for UK public finances. 
The most immediate requirement is a decision about how the remainder of the 2014-20 programme 
period will be managed for UK recipients. In this regard, it is not just the negotiations with the EU27 
that matter, but also the domestic negotiations between different interest groups and parts of the 
UK. It could mean delay in settling future economic and social development arrangements with 
adverse consequences for local strategies and difficulties in taking forward projects.  
In the longer term, Brexit will entail the recasting of spatially-targeted social and economic 
development policies and the institutions involved in delivering these policies will need fresh 
thinking. UK spatial policy has been less stable and subject to more politically driven changes than 
elsewhere in the EU, lacking a long-term strategy that can transcend changes in government. It has 
been subject to major upheavals and numerous iterations over the past 30 years, with institutions 
coming and going, along with the corresponding expertise of practitioners. The opportunity for a 
fresh approach is vulnerable to the dearth of institutional capacity crucial to develop a substitute for 
EU Cohesion Policy, potentially leading to medium-term difficulties for the less favoured social 
groups and regions across the UK. 
On balance, economic development policy at sub-national policy in the UK will have more to lose 
than to gain from Brexit. This will have social consequences and can be expected to add to demands 
for social policy responses, at a time when the public finances are under pressure. There will be 
difficult choices to be made about which tier of government in the UK assumes the burden, both 
institutionally and financially. 
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